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KENT GREENAWALT AND THE 
DIFFICULTY (IMPOSSIBILITY?)OF 
RELIGION CLAUSE THEORY 
Larry Alexander* 
When I see a book or article about the establishment clause, 
there are several things I want to know in order to assess it. First, 
what kind of approach does it take toward its subject matter? 
Does it purport to tell us how the framers and ratifiers under-
stood the clause, what their intended meaning was? Or is it an 
exploration and development of Supreme Court doctrines re-
gardless of those doctrines' relation to the originally intended 
meaning? Or is it a work of political philosophy, an account of 
the most justified relationship between government and relig-
ion? 
Kent's book is difficult to pigeonhole. It contains a brief dis-
cussion of original meaning. It contains lots of references to Su-
preme Court doctrine. But if forced to characterize it in terms of 
my classifications, I would call it a work of political philosophy-
though not one that is heavily theorized-whose normative con-
clusions turn out to be consistent with some case law and possi-
bly with Kent's view of the Constitution's original meaning, as-
suming that matters to him, which appears not to be the case. 
(He spends time attempting to rebut the narrow jurisdictional 
interpretation of the religion clauses but offers no affirmative 
account of the original meaning.) 
A second thing I want to know about a work on the estab-
lishment clause is how the author distinguishes religion from 
nonreligion. Is Marxism a religion? Transcendental meditation? 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's 
being a religion, and how do those conditions relate to the 
clause's original meaning and to doctrine? 
* Warren Distinguished Professor. University of San Diego School of Law. 
Thanks to Steve Smith for his comments. 
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Kent has written before on the definition of religion in an 
article in the California Law Review. 1 There, if I recall correctly, 
he argued that the best we could do would be to identify family 
resemblances between the creed or sect in question and paradig-
matic exemplars of religion (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam). 
That's a somewhat skeptical conclusion because it denies that 
any verdict on this issue will be demonstrable. Moreover. I can-
not see how answers can even be backed up by normative con-
siderations. Whatever normative considerations support a prin-
ciple against establishment will not cut neatly along the family 
resemblance divide. 
Kent recognizes that there is no "view from nowhere," no 
neutral position above the fray of competing metaphysical and 
normative views-or rather. that neutrality is always relative to 
some viewpoint, and that there is no Archimedean, interpersonal 
point of view to which our bare noumenal selves can repair. And 
at times he demonstrates awareness that our views do not come 
neatly separated into "religious" and "nonreligious" catego-
ries-especially since he himself has rejected the possibility of 
defining religion. 
Kent does seem to believe that "public reasons" can be dis-
tinguished from religious ones (though not neatly). He argues 
that, for officials at least, there should be a distinction drawn be-
tween the ultimate grounds for their judgments-which might 
well be religious grounds-and the arguments they present pub-
licly to justify those judgments. But because there is no neat 
theoretical line between what is and is not a "public reason," we 
are left with something like "if we are well acculturated with re-
spect to the kinds of reasons officials might offer and that will be 
taken as acceptable by most people, then we will probably know 
'public reasons' when we see them." On this view, the injunction 
that officials stick to "public reasons" in justifying their actions 
to the public seems like good practical advice for someone seek-
ing to be effective as an official and remain in office, but not a 
matter of high principle. 
How do these issues bear on the meaning of the religion 
clauses? Kent has a chapter (22) on justifications for the norms 
that the clauses express, though I found the chapter difficult for 
the following reason: We either know the content of those norms 
or we do not. If we know the content, then the question of the 
1. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law. 72 CAL. L. REV. 
753 (1984). 
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norms' justification might be interesting and quite relevant to 
whether to retain the norms or instead amend the Constitution 
to eliminate or change them, but it will not affect how we apply 
the norms. By hypothesis we already know the norms' content. 
On the other hand, if we do not know the norms' content, then 
what exactly are we doing in our search for their justification? 
Put differently, how can one "justify" a norm the content of 
which is not yet established? 
The best sense I can make out of this is that we know the 
core of the norms but not their full reach, and that the justifica-
tions assist us in determining the latter. Of course, to some ex-
tent, we cannot really know a norm's core unless it has some ca-
nonical formulation. On the other hand, perhaps all we need is 
what Jed Rubenfeld calls a "paradigm case" or two to get the 
process of inference-to-best-justification-to-full-range-of-norm 
going.2 (Of course, it is also the case that there are many norms 
that do not extend to the full range of applications their justifica-
tions would entail, for there are often competing norms that op-
erate to truncate them. A justification for religion clause norms 
might be limited in its effect by a norm of federalism, for exam-
ple.) 
What are the anti-establishment norms that Greenawalt 
finds in the establishment clause? The central norm seems to be 
one forbidding government acts that are premised on theological 
views, with subsidiary (or corollary) norms against government's 
preferring one religion over another and against government's 
"endorsing" religion or specific religions. There are a number of 
questions I could raise about these norms and that I am sure 
others will raise. But I want to focus on the central norm. 
My basic difficulty with this norm-a difficulty that I would 
have whether the norm's provenance is the intended meaning of 
the Constitution's authors or is instead Kent's political philoso-
phy- is that I believe what it requires is an impossibility. Our 
views about what actions are right and wrong, good and bad, so-
cial progress or social retrogression, ultimately rest on the entire 
web of our beliefs to the extent our beliefs cohere.3 These beliefs 
will frequently if not always include beliefs about ultimate 
grounds-metaphysical, metaethical, and theological. We might 
2. lED RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 178 (2001). 
3. See Larry Alexander. Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology. 30 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763. 767-70 (1993). 
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dissemble in reporting those grounds, or we might never be 
asked about them. Nonetheless, they will be present in our nor-
mative (and empirical) judgments. 
If that is true. then our convictions about government's 
proper relation to religion, like our views more generally, will be 
a product of our fundamental views, which I believe is what reli-
gious views are. Christianity is a religious view, but so too is 
Marxism or utilitarianism. The latter are non-theistic, but many 
"religions" one finds in representative lists of "religions" are also 
non-theistic. Our fundamental- religious- views will often in-
clude views about government's proper role, including its role 
vis-a-vis fundamental-religious-views that are, by its lights, in-
correct. It may prescribe toleration of those views. It may pre-
scribe government steering as clear as possible of certain matters 
(for example, forms of worship). Still, it will only issue such pre-
scriptions from its own fundamental (religious) vantage point.4 
What else could it do? (Note the echo of Stanley Fish's Dennis 
Martinez. 0) 
Consider Michael Perry's recent views on human rights." 
They are informed, argues Perry, by a view of human worth, a 
view which makes sense, he believes, only if one believes in a 
God who admonishes us to love each other as He loves us. 
Now suppose Perry is a government official. May he support 
human rights. or would that support rest on a theological view? 
Could he regard as other than nonsensical an injunction that he 
bracket those views in deciding whether or not to enact legal 
measures implementing human rights? For him, there are human 
rights that should be legally protected, and they stem from a re-
ligious truth-which truth is on a par with all other truths. He 
may realize that some or many people will find his arguments 
unpersuasive, which may or may not lead him to dissemble in his 
advocacy, which will in turn depend on other religious views he 
holds about how lying and consequentialist success should be 
weighed. 
This is the root problem of the religion clauses, both their 
applications and their justifications. It is the problem Steve 
4. See Lawrence A. Alexander. Is There Logical Space on the Moral Map for Tol-
eration? A Brief Comment on Smith, Morgan, and Forst. in TOLERATION AND ITS LiMITS 
300 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds .. 2008). 
5. Stanley Fish. Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773. 1773 
(1987). 
6. Michael J. Perry. Morality and Normativity. 13 LEGAL THEORY 211 (2007). 
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Smith7 and Stanley Fish' address in the works Kent responds to 
in chapter 20. I don't believe he has answered it. But I also don't 
believe it can be answered. We are stuck with our religious 
views, and they will exert their influence over us. constitutional 
provisions or no. In this area. the Constitution really is and can 
be no more than a mere parchment barrier. 
7. STEVEN D. SMITH. FOREORDAl:\ED FA!Ll"RE (1995). 
8. Stanley Fish. Mission Impossible: Seuling rhe Jusr Bounds Berween Church and 
Srare. 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997): see also Alexander. mpra note 3: Alexander. supra 
note 4. 
